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RECENT CASES
ADmINISTRATIvE OFFIcER-RELIANCE UPON CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE BY.
Defendant, doing construction work upon a federal project, sought to
come under the Workmen's Compensation Act, but was advised by that
department that the work did not fall within the provisions of the Act,
and the premiums were rejected upon the basis of an opinion by the Attorney General, altho defendant repeatedly maintained that the work fell
within -the Act. P, an employee, injured while engaged in extra hazardous
occupation, brought action alleging that D had failed to comply with the
provisions of the Act. Held, reliance upon the ruling of the administrative"
officers constituted no excuse to liability, Long v. Thompson, 77 Wash.
Dec. 203, 31 Pac. (2d) 908 (1934).
It has been frequently stated that the construction of an ambiguous
statute made by executive or administrative officers will be given weight
by the courts. Edward's Lessee v. Darby, 12 WThdat. 206, 6 L. Ed. 603,
(U. S. 1827) Ryan v. School District No. 25, 44 Wash. 523, 87 Pac. 828
(1906) State v. Datnes, 76 Wash. Dec. 43, 28 Pac. (2d) 322 (1934)
and,
it will not be disturbed except for very cogent reasons, State ex rel. Pub.
Se,,o. Coma?. v. Brannon, 86 Mont. 200, 283 Pac. 202, 67 A. L. R. 1020
(1929) re Powers, 275 Mass. 515, 176 N. E. 621, 75 A. L. R 1220 (1930).
The weight to be given will, of course, depend upon the facts of each
case; and, the courts have used a variety of language, from "great
weight," Wendt v. Industral Inc. Com.n, 80 Wash. 111, 141 Pac. 311
(1914), to "valuable," Huntworth v. Tanner 87 Wash. 670, 152 Pac. 523,
Ann. Cas. 1917D 676 (1915).
Thiere has been many rationalizations for the rule, the most prominent being the "legislative intent," viz.. where such a construction has
been of long standing, and the legislature does nothing to change the
statute, it is an implied indication that such a construction expresses
their intent. This, of course, does not apply to cases where it has not
been acted upon over a period of time, m which the rule is followed, probably, upon a desire to have uniformity. The court will likewise be reluctant to give a different construction where vested property rights are
involved, 59 C. J. 1029.
This rule, however, is not followed: (1) where not uniform; (2) where
the statute is in the opinion of the court clear and free from ambiguity,
so that the administrative construction would substantially alter the law*
(3) where though the statute is somewhat doubtful, the rulings appear to
the court as unreasonable; or (4) where the statute is in terms applicable
to certain situations and the administrative has set itself up as a legislator to supply omissions and defect in the law by applying it elsewhere,
40 H. L. R. 469 (1927).
The court in the instant case bases its holding upon -the 2nd classification, stating, "courts will construe statutes according to their true intent,
where the meaning is plain and unequivocal, notwithstanding a contrary
construction made, or practice indulged in, by executive or administrative officers." This view follows the great weight of authority Allen -V.
Long, 272 Mass. 502, 172 N. E. 643, 70 A. L. R. 1299 (1930)
Schoen u.
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Seattle, 117 Wash. 303, 201 Pac. 293 (1921) State v. Da-es, supra, Wendt
v. Industrial Ins. Comm., supra.
What, then, should the party do who believes that the construction
given by the administrative officers is erroneous, and if he follows their
9
construction it may lead to liability The court in the instant case said
that the defendant should have brought a Writ of Mandamus to compel
?
How
the acceptance of the premiums. But, is this an adequate remedy
the
trouble
and
expense
to
people
in
such
a
situation
would
go
to
many
bring such a suit, especially when the courts will try to uphold the construction of the administrative officers?
On the other hand to deny plaintiff recovery in the instant, and similar, cases would be to deprive him of a right which should not be denied.
Thus, the tendency in criminal actions to allow reliance as a defense, 22
Cal. L. Rev. 569, could not follow in civil actions.
It is submitted that the answer to this problem rests with the legislaC. P Z.
ture.
INSUlANCE-FALSE STATEMENT IN APPLICATION-INTENT TO DEcEIVEEVIDENCE. The Washington court has recently been called upon to decide
two cases interpreting Rem. Rev. Stat., sec. 7078 (1933), which provides
that no misrepresentation "shall be deemed material or defeat or avoid the
policy or prevent it from attaching, unless such misrepresentation or warranty is made with intent to deceive." In the one case, plaintiff called
at the office of defendant insurance company's agent and signed an application for a policy of fire insurance to cover a dwelling house which she
owned. The policy was issued and mailed to her with a copy of the written application attached. About one year later the house was destroyed
by fire. In the subsequent action on the policy defendant denied liability
on the ground of breach of warranty stated in the application and in the
policy' to-wit, that plaintiff had never sustained a previous fire loss.
Plaintiff admitted on trial that she had previously collected $4,500 insurance for the destruction by fire of a house in another county Plaintiff
testified that she had disclosed this fact to defendant's agent, but he
denied this. She further testified that she had read neither the application nor the policy A jury trial in the lower court resulted in a verdict
for the plaintiff, but this was reversed on appeal. The court decided that
the evidence raised an unrebutted presumption that there was an ment
to deceive, thus satisfying the requirements of Rem. Rev. Stat. sec. 7078,
supra. Perry et al vs. Continental Insurance Company, 78 Wash. Dec. 18,
33 Pac. (2d) 661 (1934).
Where material representations are made in the application known by
the applicant to be false, a rebuttable presumption of intent to deceive is
raised. Day v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 111 Wash. 49, 189 Pac.
95 (1920). In the instant case, the court held that the testimony of the
plaintiff that she had not read the application and that she had told the
agent the truth was insufficient to rebut this presumption. This case goes
even further than the case of Hayes v. Automobile Insurance Exchange.
126 Wash. 487, 218 Pac. 252 (1923), reheard 129 Wash. 202, 224 Pac. 594
(1924), in which the plaintiff merely signed a blank application and left
it to be filled in by the defendant insurance company's agent without
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giving the agent any information whatsoever as to the answers to the
queries in the application. In that case the agent did not know whether
the representations were true or false; in the instant case the agent
actually knew he was misstating a true answer made by the applicant.
Yet the court, relying on the Hayes case, arrived at the same result, that
the presumption of intent to deceive was unrebutted. This holding seems
contrary to the position taken by the court in a number of earlier cases,
deciding that a showing by the applicant that he had told the agent the
truth was sufficient to rebut the presumption. Devenny V. Auto. Owners
Lzndstrom
Inter-Ins. Ass'n of Wash., 124 Wash. 453, 214 Pac. 833 (1923)
v. Employers Indeminity Corp., 146 Wash. 484, 263 Pac. 953 (1928) Tison
v. Amercan National Ins. Co., 163 Wash. 522. 1 Pac. (2d) 859, 3 Pac. (2d)
998 (1931). Cf. Turner v. Amenrcan Casualty Co., 69 Wash. 154, 124 Pac.
486 (1912) (based on estoppel).
Within a month, a similar problem was raised in another case. Here,
In an action on an automobile liability policy, defendant denied. liability
on the ground of breach of warranty, in that in response to the question
whether insured had had an accident within the past three years as the
result of the ownership or operation of an auto vehicle, insured had
answered that he had not. The evidence showed that within the threeyear period about fourteen accidents had occurred, involving automobiles
which either insured or a corporation in which insured was a principai
stockholder owned or operated. Insured denied intent to deceive within
the provisions of Rem. Rev. Stat., sec. 7078, supra, testifying that he
thought the inquiry in the policy was in regard to accidents in which
Insured had been at fault. In all of these prior accidents no liability
had been fastened on the insured or his corporation. The trial court,
sitting without a jury, found for plaintiff. Reversed on appeal for defendant insurance company, the court finding an intent to deceive.
McCann v. Reeder et al. & Mercer Casualty Company, 78 Wash. Dec. 111,
34 Pac. (2d) 461 (1934).
The court must have held. in this case that the evidence was such
that it was impossible for a jury or other trier of the facts reasonably
to find that the insured had construed the inquiry as he claimed, that he
must have construed it as applying to all accidents regardless of fault.
On this basis, the court seems to be swinging away from its holding in
the case of Houston v. New York Life Ins. Co., 159 Wash. 162, 292 Pac.
445 (1930), reported on a second trial in 166 Wash. 611, 8 Pac. (2d) 434
(1932). In the latter case, the evidence showed that a month before insured's application for reinstatement of his insurance policy was submitted, insured had been informed by a doctor that his appendix should
be removed, and had had the operation, in fact, a month after his application, and yet he had stated in his application that he had had. no illness
and consulted no physician during the previous six months, except one
visit for grippe. The court held on the second trial that it was a matter
of fact for the jury to decide whether the applicant had construed the
inquiry as applying only to serious ailments and whether he thought at
the time of the application that his appendicitis attack was serious. On
the facts of the two cases, it would appear that the court had as much
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reason to submit to the jury the issue of how the applicant had construed
the inquiry in the application in the McCann case as in the Houston case.
It would thus seem from these two recent cases that the court is beginning to draw away from its liberal viewpoint expressed in the Houston
case and the other older cases above cited. This point is stressed in strong
dissenting opinions rendered by Tolman. J., and Holcomb, J., respectively.
For a discussion of the earlier cases see Note 6, 6 Wash. L. Rev. 34 (1931).
D. B.
-L.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-DuTY OF LANDLORD TO FURNISH HEAT, WATER,
ELEVATOR SERVICE, ETC. P who was engaged in the clothing business,
leased certain portions of a two-story building from 1907 to 1919 under
certain written leases which did not specifically provide that the landlord
was to furnish heat and water, but which nevertheless were furnished by
him without any other consideration than the rental paid. From 1919
to 1926, P leased the entire two-story building, and during that time paid
for his own heat and water. In 1926, P agreed to a cancellation of his
lease which still had eight years to run, to enable the Liggett Co. to take
a 99-year lease of the two-story structure. P received in consideration of
his agreement to cancel his former lease, a 12 year lease from the Liggett
Co., by the terms of which the Liggett Co. expressly agreed to furnish P
with heat and elevator service in a new contemplated ten-story structure
which was to be erected on the old two-story site. Nothing was said at
that time about water, toilets or janitor service. Several months later,
when the ten-story building was being erected, the same parties cancelled the former 12-year lease and entered into a new one of the entire
second story for a 20-year period, nothing whatsoever being said in the
last lease with reference to either heat, water, elevator, or janitor service.
On the same day however, P sublet the premises back to the Liggett Co.
for the entire term except one day under a written lease, which omitted
any mention of the above services. The new ten-story building was
constructed with a central water and heating system, four passenger and
one freight elevators, and the building on all floors was equipped with
hallways to the elevator systems. However the second story which was
leased had a direct opening on to the street by means of a ramp. P
never went into occupancy of the second floor, until about six years later,
when the Liggett Co. went insolvent. P thereupon entered, and paid for
his heat for about six months, until D, who was the assignee of Liggett
Co., refused to furnish either heat, water, or elevator service. P now
seeks to restrain D from discontinuing such services. Held: that D was
under no duty to furnish either heat. water, elevator, or janitor service
to P. Tailored Ready Co., v. Fourth & Pike Street Corp., 78 Wash. Dec.
594. 35 Pac. (2d.) 508 (1934).
In general: The general rule supported by the overwhelming weight
of authority is that a landlord is under no obligation to furnish heat,
water (or hot water), steam for heat, or power, or a current of forced
air to his tenant, in the absence of a statutory requirement, or an express
agreement, or of circumstances raising an implied covenant to furnish
such services. 36 C. J. p. 36. The same rule is applicable also to elevator
service. Cu-nvumngs v. Perry, 38 L. R. A. 149 (Mass. 1897). There is
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usually no difficulty in determining the rights of the parties where there
is an express agreement of a statute governing the situation, but the
great bulk of litigation, which the courts are very often called upon to
decide, is whether or not m the absence of express agreement or statutory
duty, the circumstances are strong enough to raise an implied covenant
to furnish such services. In considering the latter situation, the courts
are aided with the general rule that a lease of a part of the building
passes with it as an incident thereto, everything necessary with or reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the part demised. 2 Thompson,
Real Property, sec, 1107 lunyon v. City of Los Angeles, 180 Pac. 837
(Cal. 1919). Implied covenants of this kind run with the land and are
binding upon the assignee of the landlord. 36 C. J. p. 637. However, it
Is necessity and not mere convenience which passes certain incidents as
appurtenances in a lease or grant of real property. Jemo v. Tourist Hotel
Co., 35 Wash. 595, 104 Pac. 820 (1909) Harrison v. Ziegler, 196 Pac. 914
(Cal. 1912).
Water*At common law there was no duty or obligation on the part of
the landlord to furnish water to his tenant. Waldron v. International
Water Co., 13 A. L. R. 340 (Vt. 1921) Farmer v. City of Naslhville, 45
L. R, A. (N. S.) 240 (Tenn. 1913). This rule is recognized today in most
jurisdictions. Thus a lease of a bedroom was held not to carry with it
as a necessary incident thereto, a right to a supply of water in Sturmi .
Huck, 71 Atl. 44 (N. J. 1908) the fact that a house was fitted with pipes
and fixtures, obviously designed. to receive and distribute water, does not
bind the landlord to furnish water to a tenant in the absence of a special
statute or stipulation to that effect. Sheldon v. Hamilton, 47 AtI. 316 (R.
I. 1900) Rockford Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. City of Rockford, 185 N. E. 623
(;Ill. 1933)
Coal Co. -. Zarsrs, 300 S. W. 615 (Ky. 1928). The fact that
the first lease expressly requires the tenant to pay the water rates, and
the second lease of the same premises is silent on that matter, does not
raise an implied covenant by the landlord to furnish water free to the
tenant, on the theory that the water was essential to the premises for
the purpose for which they were leased. Lesgton. v. Ricker, 54 N. E. 254
(Mass. 1899).
Heat: It may safely be said that a landlord renting an apartment or
room in a building heated by a central heating plant, control over which
is retained by hin, is bound to heat such apartment or room even when
the lease is silent on the question of heat. This rule is supported by practically all of the authorities. Jackson. v. Paterno,112 N. Y. S. 924 (1908)
Cummngs v. Parry,38 L. R. A. 149 (Mass. 1897) Berlinger v. Macdonald,
133 N. Y. S. 522 (1912) Ryan v. Jones, 20 N. Y. S. 842 (1892) O'Hanlon
v. Grubb, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1213 (D. C. 1911) Havens v. Broum, 237
S. W 126 (Mo. 1922), Cushier v. Adams, 134 N. Y. S. 561 (1912) but see
Coal Co. v. Zarirs, supra.
Elevator service: In the case of an apartment house or office building
in which rooms are rented, where there are elevators, there is an applied
covenant that the tenant will be supplied with such services and facilities
in the same manner as other tenants, if the use of elevators is reasonably
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necessary for the beneficial occupation of the rooms let, and if from a
construction of the elevators and of the passageways it is apparent that
the elevators were intended for the use of the tenants. Cummings v.
Perry, supra, O'Hanlon v. Grubb, supra, Order Hall. v. Irvin, 79 N. Y. S.
614 (1903). Toilets: The use of closets contiguous to rooms rented in an
office building and of the wash basins therein is included in the lease,
though not specifically mentioned. Order Hall v. Irmn, supra.
In the case noted above, there was no obligation to furnish any of the
above named services arising either by virtue of a statute or by express
covenant in the lease. P's chief contention being that such obligation
arose from the circumstances implying a covenant to so furnish these conveniences. The court, however, negatived P's contention that such services were a necessity to P on the second floor of the building, so as to
pass as appurtenances in the lease, and held that they were conveniences in the case. An entirely different situation, said the court, being
presented where the occupancy of the tenant is on the sixth or seventh
floors of an office building, where elevator service is very essential to
the occupation of the premises for business purposes, or heat in a hotel
or apartment building where the heating systems are under the sole
control of the landlord. (It is not clear from the opinion just how the
court arrived at the view that heat on the second floor is not just as necessary for a comfortable enjoyment thereof, as on the sixth or seventh
floors.) Another very strong factor which was used by both P and D in
urging their respective contentions was that there was an eloquent silence
in the second lease entered into between P and the Liggett Co., in regard
to such services, which were expressly covered in the first lease between
the parties. P attempted to explain its absence, by urging that there was
no necessity to make express mention of these services, since both parties
would take it for granted that they would be continued under the new
lease; D argued that the omission from the language of the twentyyear lease of such important matters on the part of such experienced business men as the managers of P was extremely significant to show such
services were never intended to be furnished.
It is submitted that the court's holding in the present case is sustainable from both a legal and moral standpoint. The most significant point
in the entire case is the fact that P did not intend to go into actual possession under the twenty-year lease, but intended to go out of business and
sublet the second floor for virtually the entire term to the Liggett Co. P
never dreamed that the Liggett Co. would become insolvent in six short
years, and that it would once again go into occupancy of the second floor.
It is easy to see then why the parties in the 20-year lease omitted all
mention of such services, which were present in the 12-year-lease when
P was intending to stay in business and occupy the premises itself. The
fact that P paid for the heat after he took possession upon the insolvency
of the Liggett Co. was an unmistakable admission that he did not think
he was entitled to such services free.
This case presents just another situation where one of the parties to
a contract which does not turn out as favorably as expected, attempts
to eke from the other party every possible advantage. Whenever this
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occurs, it is the policy of the courts to refuse to make a new contract
grounded in the equities of subsequent events, where the parties who
might have foreseen every incident and circumstance there relied on failed
to guard against them in their written contract. Robinson v. Wilson, 102
Wash. 528, 173 Pac. 331 (1918).
-J. J. L.
REAL ESTATE AGENTs-NEcEsSr1Y Fon AuTiao=IATIoI iN WrITING. X
and Y bought waterfront lots on installment contract from B. The instruments did not show and. neither purchaser knew that title to the land was
in defendant M. All the required contract payments were made by the
buyers. On discovering M's ownership they demanded conveyances from
him, which were refused, M denied that B was his agent. It was shown
that B had acted as M's agent in previous similar transactions. Held:
That M be compelled to convey to X and Y. the evidence of prior principal-agent relations between B and M with respect to -the sale of M's
property justifies the finding that B was in fact authorized in this instance. Dissent: That in the absence of ratification or of circumstances
creating an estoppel an agency to contract for the sale of real property
can be established only by written authority of the owner. There was
here no such authority. Mason v. Matthews, Bean v. Matthews, 78 Wash.
Dec. 136 (1934).
Two problems are presented in the case: 1. Was B in fact the agent of
M with authority to contract for the sale of the latter's land? 2. Can
the authority be established and M charged on .the contract in view of the
statute of frauds?
1. It is elementary agency law that actual authority to do the act
in question may be established by proof of prior similar instances in
which the agent's acts have been acquiesced in by the principal. And
when it is contended that an authority previously given has ceased or
been limited before the act in question was done, the burden of proving
that fact rests with the party alleging it, the principal, Mechemni Outlines
of Agency, sec. 111. So here, the fact that B had sold lots for M over
a considerable period by this or other similar methods is of considerable
weight in establishing that B was authorized to sign the contracts under
consideration.
2. But conceding proof to establish the agency and the extent of the
authority in this instance is available, the question arises-May it be
used to charge M on the contract as obligor, notwithstanding the fact
that his name did not appear in the instrument?
Where an agent signs a contract which is required by the statute of
frauds to be in writing, expressly stating therein that he signs as agent
but failing to disclose his principal, it is held in most jurisdictions that
the writing is insufficient to satisfy the statute. The theory is that since
the agent has exempted himself from liability by signing as agent, only
one of the contracting parties is mentioned m the instrument, which does
not answer the requirements of the statute. Parol will not be admitted
to identify the principal. Breckinridge v. Crocker 78 Cal. 529, 21 Pac. 179
(1889) ,Abrogast v. Johnson, 80 Wash. 537, 141 Pac. 1140 (1914) Banta
v. Newbold, 108 Kas. 578, 196 Pac. 433 (1921). A few jurisdictions reach
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the opposite result, permitting the principal to be identified by parol.
MlcBrayer v. Cohen, 92 Ky. 479, 18 S. W 123 (1892) Tobin v. Larkin, 183
Mass. 389, 67 N. E. 340 (1903)
cases collected in 23 A. L. R. 932.
If the writing does not disclose the fact of agency the undisclosed principal may be identified by parol and charged on the contract on proof of
the signer's agency And this because such an instrument shows two
competent contracting parties. Flegal v. Dowling, 54 Ore. 40, 102 Pac.
178 (1909) Byrne v. McDonough, 114 Misc. 529, 186 N. Y. S. 607. Aff. 188
N. Y. S. 913 (1921). There is dictum in an early Washington case apparently contra. Murphy v. Clarkson, 25 Wash. 585, 66 Pac. 51 (1901). In
the principal case, however, the court assumes without discussion of the
problem that parol evidence is admissible to identify M as B's principal
on proof of the agency.
This brings us to a consideration of whether that proof may be oral
or whether the statute of frauds requires a real estate agent's authority
to be in writing. It is generally held that no writing is necessary to
authorize an agent to contract for the sale of land unless the wording
of the statute of frauds in the particular jurisdiction expressly states that
a writing is necessary. Thus, where the statute requires the memorandum
to be signed by the party to be charged or "by some person thereunto by
him lawfully authorized," the agent's authority to sign need not be in
writing. Record v. Littlefield, 218 Mass. 483, 106 N. E. 142 (1914) Brune
v. Von Lehn, 112 Misc. 342, 183 N. Y. S. 360 (1920) Brown v. Hogan, 138
Md. 257, 113 A. 756 (1921). Contra where the statute reads "lawfully
authorized by ,riting." Hall v. Wallace, 88 Cal. 434, 26 Pac. 360 (1891)
Roberts v. Leonard, 78 Ore. 100, 152 Pac. 499 (1915)
Artz v. McCarthy.
109 Kas. 355, 199 Pac. 99 (1921). Cases collected m 27 A. L. A. 606.
Wash. Rem. Rev. Stat, 10550 provides: "Every conveyance of real
estate or any interest therein, and every contract creating or evidencing
any encumbrance upon real estate, shall be by deed." Wash. Rem. Rev.
Stat. 5825 reads: "In the following cases specified in this section, any
agreement, contract, and promise shall be void, unless such agreement,
contract or promise, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in
writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by some
person thereunto by him lawfully authorized. That is to say.
5. An
agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to sell or purchase real estate for compensation or a commission."
In a very early Washington case our Supreme Court made it plain
that under our statutes the authority of an agent to sign a contract for
the sale of realty need not be in writing. Carstens v. McCreavy, 1 Wash.
359 (1890). The point was not squarely decided there, since the issue was
whether authority "to sell" included authority to contract-the court
holding that the expression contemplated only the securing of a purchaser. In numerous subsequent cases, however, the court has had before
it the validity of an oral authorization and has held it good. Monfort v.
McDonough, 20 Wash. 710 (1898)
Peirce v. Wheeler 44 Wash. 326, 87
Pac. 361 (1906) Deggsnger v. Martin, 48 Wash. 1, 92 Pac. 674 (1907) In
the Peirce case supra, the court pointed out that sec 5825 subsec. 5, supra,
made a writing necessary only for the purpose of enabling the agent to
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sue for commission, it had no effect on the validity of the vendor-purchaser contract.
The only requirement which is made regarding the agent's authority
Is that laid down in the Deggtnger case, supra, that such authority should
be sustained by clear and convincing proof, and by the manifest preponderance of the evidence, especially where the alleged authority is denied
by the vendor or the party to be charged.
-M. W
REAL PROPERTY - RECORDING ACT - PIoiRTIEs - RECENT STATUTORY
CHANGE. In an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage, defendant counter-clained to have the mortgage canceled and title quieted in him. Plaintiff took the mortgage on the property in May 1927, through his agent,
but -the mortgage was not recorded. Defendant had been on the property
prior to May, 1927, and on June 2 of the same year, at 2:00 p. in., he
purchased the property under an unacknowledged executory sale contract. At 3:07 p. m. on the same day, plaintiff's mortgage was recorded.
The executory sale contract was recorded on June 3, through it does not
appear under what statutory provision this was done. Before the case
came to trial, defendant tendered the balance due under his contract and
demanded a deed. Defendant relied on R. C. S. sec. 10596 (now repealed)
which reads inpart, "All deeds, mortgages, and assignments of mortgages,
shall be recorded,
and shall be valid as against bona fide purchasers
from the date of their filing
and when so filed shall be notice to all
the world." The court found for the plaintiff. Held: The court should
have given judgment for the defendant on the counter-claim. Nichol&s v.
DeBritz, 78 Wash. Dec. 327 (1934).
Assuming the court to have been correct in their assumption that the
defendant was a bona fide purchaser, the decision reached is undeniably
correct. Coolidge v. Schersng, 32 Wash. 557, 73 Pac. 682 (1903)
Swanstrom. v. Washington Trust Co., 41 Wash. 561, 83 Pac. 1112 (1906).
The fact that the contract was not acknowledged cannot affect defendant's standing as a bon fide purchaser, since it was binding on the
parties to it. Falei-'V. P rng, 144 Wash. 224, 257 Pac. 627 (1927). A somewhat more difficult problem arises under Ashford, v. Reese, 132 Wash. 649,
233 Pac. 29 (1925), where in the majority opinion it was said. "
that
an executory contract of sale in this state conveys no title or interest,
either legal or equitable, to the vendee
" If such be true, it is difficult
to see how the defendant could be a bonoi fide purchaser. However, considering the rather chaotic condition of the law as concerns the vendee
under an executory contract, it would seem that each decision is its own
best authority.
It seems important to note here that the decision reached in the instant case depends entirely on Rem. Comp. Stat., sec. 10596, which is now
repealed. The new statute, Rem. Rev. Stat., see. 10596-2, rads, "
Every
such conveyance not so recorded is void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration
whose conveyance ts first recorded
" The emphasis is now placed on which purchaser Is the first to record. No decisions have been found. where the
new statute has controlled, but where it has been mentioned, the court
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has apparently ascribed to it a literal meaning. Ashton v. Buell. 149
Wash. 494, 271 Pac. 591 (1928) Rehn v. Reilly, 161 Wash. 418, 297 Pac.
147 (1931)
Kroetc v. Hinnenkanp, 171 Wash. 518, 18 Pac. (2d) 491
(1933). Thus, apart from any question of fraud or collusion, it follows
that had the instant case been governed by the new statute, the plaintiff
would have been entitled to judgment.
-R. Y.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-COMMUNITY PROPERTY. Plaintiff and defendant
entered into a contract whereby the plaintiff was to build a house on his
lot for the defendant for $11,250. The house was completed and the defendant moved in, but thereafter he refused to make the payments according to the terms of the contract, and the plaintiff-vendor sues for specific
performance. The court, in holding for the defendant-vendee, stated that
as the property contracted to be sold was the community property of the
plaintiff and his wife, and as she was not joined as a party plaintiff nor
was there any evidence to the effect that she was willing to join in a
conveyance, a decree for specific performance would, not be granted against
one party when the contract could not be specifically enforced against the
other, Janssen v. Dams, 29 Pac. (2d) 196 (Cal. 1934).
It appears that this rule, of lack of mutuality as being a reason for
denying specific performance, is in keeping with the California Code,
Civ. Code, sec. 3386, and with equitable principles of that state as laid
down in Pacific Electric Ry. Co. v. Campbell-Johnson, 153 Cal. 106, 94 Pac.
623 (1908)
Jolliffe v. Steele, 9 Cal. App. 212, 98 Pac. 544 (1908)
and
Waldecc v. Hedden, 89 Cal. App. 485, 265 Pac. 340 (1928)
This view is in accordance with the general rule in other states, specific performance being dependent upon the existence in the defendant of
the right to similar relief; and although the older cases declare the
time when such mutuality is to be measured, the inception of the contract,
the later cases, portraying possibly a better view make the test as of the
time when the decree is to be rendered. 25 R. C. L. 233-4. 65 A. L. R. 46.
Washington, in passing upon this question, has said that a contract
not possessing mutuality will not be enforced specifically. Virtue v. Stanlel, 87 Wash, 167, 151 Pac. 270 (1915) Wagner v. Peshastin Lumber Co.,
149 Wash. 328, 270 Pac. 1032 (1928)
and in Roche v. Madar 104 Wash.
21, 175 Pac. 314 (1918), where attorneys were suing for specific delivery
of shares of stock promised in return for services which had been rendered at the time of the institution of the action, the court on page 25
said.
"But as we understand the doctrine of mutuality of remedies, it applies only where the contract is executory not to
a contract which has been fully performed on one side and
nothing remains to be done on the other but turn over the
agreed compensation for the performance * * * The question
is not, was there originally a lack of mutuality of remedy
*

*

*,,

However, in the co-operative marketing cases, Whshington has not
applied the rule of mutuality because of the undesirable social result
that would otherwise be brought about, and has made provision spe-
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cifically by statute, Rem. Rev. Stat., sec. 2892. See 9 Wash. L. R. 56.
It seems to be the policy of our law not to deprive owners of their
property without notice so that a husband can not alienate community
property without the knowledge or consent of his wife. A husband
would have the right to sell his wife's interest in the community upon
the execution by her of a power of attorney, Rem. Rev. Stat., sec. 10575,
but a general power of attorney will not give him the right to make a
dedication for street purposes, Anderson v. B-gelow, 16 Wash. 198, 47
Pac. 426 (1896). The wife, as well as the husband, must be joined in a
condemnation proceeding, Chehalis County v. BlUngton, 21 Wash. 638, 59
Pac. 485 (1899)
where defendant's wife was not a party to either the
contract or the action, a decree to convey community property will not
a
be ordered, Armstrong v. Oakley, 23 Wash. 122, 62 Pac. 499 (1900)
plaintiff acquired no rights by virtue of a contract relative to the use of
community property which the wife refused to sign, Northwestern Lumand a trade of
ber Co. v. Bloom, 135 Wash. 195, 237 Pac. 295 (1925)
community property arranged for by the husband cannot be specifically
enforced where the wife refused to consent to the transaction and did
not ratify It, Bush v. Qualffe, 138 Wash. 533, 244 Pac. 704 (1926).
There is no doubt, on principle, but that a wife should be given adequate protection as to her interest in the property of the community.
And it should follow that if one who has contracted for the purchase of
such real property can not force her to perform specifically then her
husband should not be able to force the purchaser to perform specificallyfor if such a decree were given, it would not include the wife and would
deny the purchaser -the agreed exchange for his performance. Parties
need not necessarily have identical remedies, but a defendant should be
assured of the fact that he will not be compelled to perform specifically
without good security that he will receive specifically the agreed equivalent in exchange. Restatement of the Law of Contracts,secs. 372 and 373.
Perhaps the most enlightened rule on the subject was stated by Cardoza
in Epstein v. Gluckzn, 233 N. Y. 490, 135 N. E. 861 (1922), in which he
said in effect, that if the decree operates without injustice or oppression to
either plaintiff or defendant. then specific performance will be granted,
with mutuality of remedy important only so far as it goes to that end,
mutuality being secondary to the principle that equity seeks to do justice.
On the other hand, suppose that the wife allows the husband to enter
negotiations relative to the disposition of the community lands and for
a period of time allows the transactions -to proceed without evidencing
any dissent thereto, having knowledge of -the entire matter, then she will
be considered as having consented to the proceedings, Young V. Porter
27 Wash. 551, 68 Pac. 362 (1902) or that the wife holds the husband out
as her agent to manage her property and with knowledge accepts the
benefits resulting therefrom, she will then be estopped to deny the authoror where the
ization, Horr v. Hollis, 20 Whsh. 424, 55 Pac. 565 (1898)
wife joins in the suit, claiming the benefits of the contract, she is held
to have ratified the contract from its inception, Whiting v. Doughton, 31
Wash. 327, 71 Pac. 1026 (1903).
If therefore the state of facts were such that the wife could be said

178

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

to have acquiesced in the making of the contract by her husband so
that she would be estopped from denying its validity as to her, then it
would seem as though the defect existing at the inception of the contract
would have been remedied, with the result that, inasmuch as the defendant could secure specific performance, it would insure his getting his
agreed exchange so that there would be no hardship in granting a decree
to the plaintiff.
F T. R.
TAXATION-INHERITANCE

TAXEs-ExEmPTioxS-PROCEEDS

OF

LIFE

IN-

SURAN cE POLICIES. Insured took out two policies of insurance upon his
life in the total sum of $17,000, each payable in the event of his death, to
his wife. Each policy contained a provision reserving to insured the right
to change the beneficiary. Shortly before his death, insured caused the
two policies to be made payable to a bank, reserving the right to change
the designation of 'the beneficiary then made. On the same date, insured
entered into a trust agreement with this same bank, whereby upon msured's death, the bank as trustee, agreed to collect the proceeds of the
policies, and to invest the same in the manner therein provided, for the
benefit of insured's three children. Upon insured's death, the amount due
upon the insurance policies was duly paid to the bank as trustee under
the above mentioned agreement. The bank who was also made executor
of insured's estate, then filed a petition praying that the proceeds of the
policies received by it as the beneficiary under the policies be adjudged
exempt from inheritance tax. The lower court granted the petition. Held:
Judgment affirmed. The proceeds of a life insurance policy payable to a
designated beneficiary (not the estate) are not subject to an inheritance
tax, by virtue of Rent. Rev. Stat. 11201-1. In re Kilien, 78 Wash. Dec. 292
(1934).
The question whether the succession tax is payable in respect to insurance carried by the decedent upon his own life has been frequently presented, both in cases where the proceeds were payable 'to a designated
beneficiary and cases where the proceeds were payable to the decedent's
estate or to his executors or administrators.
As a general rule, except where specifically mentioned (as in Wisconsin statute and Federal Revenue Act 1918), ,the proceeds of a life insurance
policy payable 'to a designated beneficiary are not subject to a succession
tax. Vogel's Estate, 1 Pa. Co. Ct. 353 (1886)
Re Fay, 55 N. Y. S. 759
(1898) State Tax Comrs. v. Holliday, 49 N. E. 14 (Ind. 1898) Bullen's
Estate, 128 N. W 109 (Wis. 1910), affirmed in 60 L. Ed. 830 (1916)
Tyler v. Treasurer 115 N. E. 300 (Mass. 1917) Allis's Will, 184 N. W 381
(Wis. 1921) Ge-zer's Success-ton, 32 A. L. R. 353 (La. 1924) In re Parson's
Estate, 102 N. Y. S. 168 (1907) In re Elting's Estate, 140 N. Y. S. 238
(1912) In re Voorhees' Estate, 193 N. Y. S. 168 (1922) In re Haedrch's
Estate, 236 N. Y. S. 395. But if the policy is payable to 'the insured's
estate, and is not assigned by him, so that at his death it becomes an
asset of his estate, the proceeds of the policy are subject to a succession
'tax. Re Knoedler 35 N. E. 601 (N. Y. 1893) Re Reed, 47 A. L. R. 522
(N. Y. 1926). However, if the policy is assigned by the insured, under
such circumstances as to indicate an intent to evade the succession tax,
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within the meaning of statutes taxing transfers made m contemplation
of death, the proceeds of such policies are subject to a succession tax.
In re Einstein, 186 N. Y. S. 931 (1921).
The recent Washington case noted above is the first adjudication upon
this subject by our supreme court, and follows the general rule mentioned above. In this state. the general inheritance tax statute provides
for the imposition of an inheritance tax only on all property, or any
interest therein, which passes (1) by will or by the statute of inheritance;
or (2) by deed, grant, sale or gift (a) made in contemplation of the
death of the grantor or donor, or (b) made or intended to take effect in
possession or in enjoyment after the death of the grantor or donor.
Remn. Rev. Stat. 11201. Another provision of the inheritance tax statute
m this state, expressly exempts from the -tax the proceeds of all life
insurance policies, except thoes payable to the estate of the deceased
insured. Rev.. Rev. Stat. 11201-1.
The syllogistic reasoning of the court m arriving at the conclusion
they did, was to the effect that the inheritance tax is an exaction by the
state for permitting to be done that which can be done only with the
state's permission. In re Sherwooi's Estate, 122 Wash. 648, 211 Pac. 734
(1922). It can have no application therefore to that for which the state's
permission is not required. As life insurance is a contract made by one
person for the benefit of another, in which contract, the death of the insured is not a factor except as fixing the time for performance by the
insurance company, and as the right to make the contract and the right
to fix the time for performance do not depend upon permission from the
state, the contract of insurance therefore, where the proceeds thereof are
payable to a designated beneficiary, is not subject to the inheritance tax.
Besides, It is the public policy of the state, as reflected by Rem. Rev. Stat.
11201-1, to exempt insurance from the burden of the inheritance tax, in
order to encourage the development of insurance for the protection of
dependents. The court also reasoned that the trust agreement entered
into between the insured and the -bank was not contrary to public policy,
since it was in direct furtherance of the design to protect those for whom
insurance protection was intended.
The reservation oftthe right to change the beneficiary of a policy of
insurance does not render the proceeds of the policy subject to an inheritance tax. In re Parsons'Estate, supra; sn re Voorhees' Estate, supra,
In re Haedrcw's Estate, supra. The reservation of the right of revocation in a deed of trust does not render the beneficiaries of the trust liable
to an inheritance tax under a statute imposing such taxes where the
deed, grant, or gift is to -take effect in possession or enjoyment after
death. In re Dolan's Estate, 49 A. L. R. 858 (Pa. 1924). A trust established by a man for the benefit of his children and their appointees does
not become taxable as in contemplation of death merely because a power
of revocation is reserved in it. People v. Northern Trust Co., 7 A. L. R.
709 (fI1. 1919). The fact that the beneficiary named in the policy holds
as trustee does not render the proceeds of the policy subject to an inheritance tax. In re Elting's Estate, supra, In re Voorhees' Estate, supra; In
re Haedrichs Estate, supra.
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The only authority supporting a contrary view is Fagan v. Bugbee,
143 Atl. 807 (N. J. 1928), which held upon facts like those in the Washington case just decided, that the beneficiaries took by deed of trust and
not by contract of insurance, and hence were subject to pay the inheritance tax. The Fagan case stands solitary and alone and has been expressly repudiated by the New York courts. In re Haedrich's Estate,
supra. Even in New Jersey the rule laid down by the Fagan case has
been expressly changed by statute. Ch. 144, see. 1, Subd. B and C of the
Laws of 1929, p. 352. Our own legislature passed chapter 135. Laws of
1929, p. 352, which is now Rem Rev. Stat. 11201-1, directly after the decision in the Fagan case.
The tendency in recent years in many states has been to exempt life
insurance proceeds from taxation, by statute if payable to a beneficiary
other than the estate, whether payable directly to or through a trustee.
Among the states enacting such statutes in addition to Washington, are
California, Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon,
J. J. L.
Pennsylvania, and Wyoming.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES-IRRiGATIoN

DiSTRICTS-NATURE AND STATUS

AS MUNICIPAL CORPORATIOus-SPEcIAL LEGISLATION. In the two recent decisions of Washington National Investment Co. v. Grandvew Irr Dist., 75
Wash. Dec. 557, 28 Paa. (2d) 114 (1933) and Outlook Irr Dist. v. Fels,
76 Wash. Dec. 139, 28 Pac. (2d) 996 (1934), which involved the power of
the legislature to confer certain emergency powers upon the boards of
directors of irrigation districts, it was held that irrigation districts were
"municipal corporations" under section 12, article 1, of the state constitution which prohibits the passage of laws granting to citizens or corporations, other than munscipal, privileges or immunities which, upon the
same terms, do not equally belong to all citizens or corporations.
In the following Washington cases irrigation districts have been held
to be municipal corporations: Brown Bros. v. Columbia Irr Dist., 82 Wash.
274, 144 Pac. 74 (1914)
Holt v. Hamilton, 118 Wash. 91, 202 Pac. 971
(1921) State ex rel. Clancy v. Columbia Irr Dist., 121 Wash. 79, 208 Pac.
Burbank Irr Dist. v. Douglass, 143 Wash. 385, 255 Pac. 360
27 (1922)
and Roberts 'v. Richland Irr Dist. 169 Wash. 156, 13 Pac. (2d)
(1927)
437 (1932)
while in the following cases irrigation districts were held
not to be "municipal corporations" Board of Directors v. Peterson, 4
Wash. 147, 29 Pac. 995 (1892), Peters v. Union Gap Irr Dist., 98 Wash.
412, 168 Pac. 1085, In re Riverside Irr Dist., 129 Wash. 627, 225 Pac. 636
(1924) Columbia Irr Dist. v. Benton County, 149 Wash. 234, 270 Pac. 813
(1928), and Doty v. Saddler 151 Wash. 542, 276 Pac. 891 (1929).
In Columbia Irr Dist. v. Benton County, supra, all of the previous
cases were reviewed and a distinction made between those cases which
involved a constitutional provision and those which interpreted statutory
provisions. It was there said that under the constitutional provisions
irrigation districts were not municipal corporations, but under the statutory provisions they were municipal corporations because in this latter
class of cases questions were involved which were necessary for their
very existence. Later in Doty v. Saddler supra, it was decided that irri-
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gation districts were not municipal corporations within the meaning of
the statute which exempted municipal corporations from garnishments
until 3udgment was given in a -main action. In connection with the distinction laid down in the Benton County case, it would seem that the
Doty case was out of line, but it might be distinguished from the- other
statutory cases in that in the Doty case the statute was one which conferred a special immunity which was not necessary for the existence of
irrigation districts, while in the other statutory cases either obligations
or privileges necessary to their existence were involved.
It is somewhat difficult to determine the effect of the two principal
cases on the legal status of irrigation districts because in the Granatvew
case none of the previous cases on this question were mentioned or discussed, and in the Outlook case only a brief reference was made to Columbza Irr Dist. v. Benton County and Doty v. Saddler, without any
mention of the distinction laid down in the Benton County case. It might
be a fair assumption to make that the principle of the Benton County case
is overruled by implication, and that the court now recognizes that irrigation districts are not organized merely for the private benefit of the
land owners, but are organized for a public purpose which is essential
for the existence of whole sections of the arid portions of our state.
On the other hand it may be doubted that they stand for any such a
proposition since the holding that irrigation districts were municipal corporations within the meaning of the constitutional provison was mere
dictum because it is not clear that the two statutes under consideration
were special laws at all, since they applied to all irrigation districts
alike and such a holding was not necessary for the disposition of the
cases. Nelson v. Troy, 11 Wash. 435, 39 Pac. 974 (13895)
Swanson V.
School Dist. No. 15, 109 Wash. 652, 187 Pac. 386 (1920)
see generally
Annotations Rem. Rev. Stat., Vol. 1, pp. 363-71, Remington Digest, Statutes, sec. 100; American Digests, Statutes, sec. 66-104, Dillon, Municipal
Corporations (5th ed. 1911) ch. V sec. 141-175, pp. 240-335, Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (Carrington's 8th ed. 1927) p. 258, 8n.
D. R.
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